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Recombinant Identities: Biometrics and Narrative Bioethics 
 
Btihaj Ajana 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in finding stronger means of securitising identity 
against the various risks presented by the mobile globalised world. Biometric technology has 
featured quite prominently on the policy and security agenda of many countries. It is being 
promoted as the solution du jour for protecting and managing the uniqueness of identity in order to 
combat identity theft and fraud, crime and terrorism, illegal work and employment, and to 
efficiently govern various domains and services including asylum, immigration and social welfare. 
In this paper, I shall interrogate the ways in which biometrics is about the uniqueness of identity 
and what kind of identity biometrics is concerned with. I argue that in posing such questions at the 
outset, we can start delimiting the distinctive bioethical stakes of biometrics beyond the all-too-
familiar concerns of privacy, data protection and the like. I take cue mostly from Cavarero’s 
Arendt-inspired distinction between the “what” and the “who” elements of a person, and from 
Ricoeur’s distinction between the “idem” and “ipse” versions of identity. By engaging with these 
philosophical distinctions and concepts, and with particular reference to the example of asylum 
policy, I seek to examine and emphasise an important ethical issue pertaining to the practice of 
biometric identification. This issue relates mainly to the paradigmatic shift from the biographical 
story (which for so long has been the means by which an asylum application is assessed) to bio-
digital samples (that are now the basis for managing and controlling the identities of asylum 
applicants). The purging of identity from its narrative dimension lies at the core of biometric 
technology’s overzealous aspiration to accuracy, precision and objectivity, and raises one of the 
most pressing bioethical questions vis-à-vis the realm of identification. 
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Who are you? Tu quis es. That is an abyssal question. 
        Schmitt 1950 
 
Identity is never a peaceful acquisition: it is claimed as a guarantee against a threat of 
annihilation that can be figured by “another identity” (a foreign identity) or by an 
“erasing of identities” (a depersonalisation). 
Balibar 1995, 186 
 
 
Introduction  
Historically, and whether at the micro (individual) or macro (societal) level, the notion of 
identity has often been bound up with that of conflict or crisis. Contemporary articulations and 
practices of identity are no exception. They are increasingly being marked by what Anthony 
Giddens (1991) refers to as “ontological insecurity”; that is, a deep sense of anxiety and 
uncertainty about the question of ‘who someone is’ in relation to oneself and to others, be they 
other individuals or institutions. Rightly or wrongly, out of convenience or out of paranoia, 
identity is now routinely being problematised in terms of risk, or more specifically, as being at 
risk; the risk of fraud, the risk of crime, the risk of terrorism, the risk of illegal immigration, the 
risk of illegal working, and so on. And within the current policy debates and discussions, with 
regard to the myriad of security challenges and the difficulties of managing and administering 
social services, the age-old question of “who is who?” continues to occupy centre stage, not 
only because of its highly political relevance, especially to issues relating to the much-contested 
domain of membership and the attribution of rights and obligations, but also because of its 
inherent and irreducible ambiguity, which poses a challenge to the ongoing and enduring 
attempts to find a definitive and fixed answer to it. As a response to such challenges, various 
techniques and technologies have been mobilised with the aim to protect and manage the 
uniqueness of identity. Among the most notable of these techniques is the securitisation of 
identity through biometric technology.  
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Biometrics, which is literally the measurement of life, refers to the technology of measuring, 
analysing and processing the digital representations of unique biological data and behavioural 
traits such as fingerprints, eye retinas, irises, voice and facial patterns, body odours, hand 
geometry, etc. It can be used in two ways: identification/recognition in order to determine who 
the person is, through one-to-many comparison, and verification/authentication in order to 
determine whether the person is who he claims to be, through one-to-one comparison (Mordini 
and Petrini 2007, 5). The emergence of biometrics as a “popular candidate” (Lyon 2003, 667) 
for identification and authentication systems is mainly due to its ability to automate the process 
of linking bodies to identities, to distribute biological and behavioural data across computer 
networks and databases, to be adapted to different uses and purposes, and to (allegedly) provide 
more accurate, reliable, and tamper-proof means of verifying identity. Like other (traditional) 
identification systems, the procedure of biometric identification consists of four stages: 
enrolment (digital representations of unique biological features are captured through a sensor 
device, and then processed through an algorithmic operation to produce a template), storage 
(the produced template is stored on a database or/and on a chipcard), acquisition (as with the 
enrolment stage, a biometric image is captured and transformed through similar algorithmic 
procedures into a live template), and matching (the live template is compared to the stored 
template to establish whether the person is known to the system, in the case of database, or 
whether the live biometric capture corresponds to the one on the card, in the case of chipcard) 
(European Commission 2005a, 35). Worth mentioning here that the principle of biometrics is 
not new, but has its roots in various earlier technologies which also sought to bind the body to 
identity for the purpose of identification. Examples of such technologies can be found in the 
developments that took place during the nineteenth century. Anthropometry and fingerprinting, 
for instance, are some of the main techniques that were adopted then. The initial rationale 
behind these technologies was to create a criminal history by which the state could distinguish 
between first-time offenders and ‘recidivists’, and respond to the challenges posed by the 
increasing migration of individuals and the rapid urbanisation of cities (Cole 2003, 2-3). Both of 
these technologies relied on the body as a means of personal identification (through various 
mechanisms such as ‘measurement’, photographing, documentation, classification, etc.) and on 
storage systems for archiving and retrieving information about identity.   
 
In recent years, and particularly following the events of September 11 and other attacks, 
biometric technology has witnessed a massive growth and a rapid proliferation within many 
areas of society. Its application, which was traditionally reserved for particular practices such as 
 4 
criminal investigations, is now covering a broad array of spaces and functions, ranging from 
border control and asylum regulation to the management of social services and medical records. 
Unsurprisingly, this expansion in scale and deployment has triggered a host of concerns over the 
potential ethical implications of biometric technology. The majority of these concerns, however, 
remain largely framed within the normative discourses of privacy, liberty and data protection, 
leaving aside other issues which are by no means less pertinent to the political and ethical 
analysis of the use of biometrics as a means of identification and identity verification.   
 
In this paper, I shall address one specific aspect of the “bioethics of biometrics”, an aspect 
that⎯despite its fundamental relevance, and with a few exceptions (van der Ploeg 1999a; Aas 
2006; Ceyhan, 2008; Lyon 2008)⎯has not yet managed to secure the space it deserves within 
the academic literature on biometrics and its implications. This aspect relates mainly to the 
relatively basic and commonplace, but also highly problematic and notoriously intricate, 
question “who are you?” which, in my view, constitutes an interesting backdrop against which 
one may start delineating the distinctive bioethical characteristics of biometrics beyond the 
familiar trope of privacy and the like. For it encapsulates the ontological and epistemological 
challenges of uniqueness and identity that biometric technology aspires to respond to and 
manage. Inevitably, addressing such a question in relation to biometrics requires us to inquire, 
first and foremost, into the ways in which biometrics is about the uniqueness of identity and into 
the kind of identity biometrics is concerned with. One way into this inquiry is to be found in the 
question of identity itself.  
  
The identity in question 
Everyone’s unique. Let us keep it that way. 
UK Home Office 2008 
 
In a sense, and at least at the systematic and structural level, recent attempts to securitise 
identity through biometric technology seem to have, as one of their main tasks, the 
simplification of the meaning and function of identity. They are underpinned by scientific 
discourses and practices that tend to convert the subjective, and in many ways, profound 
dimensions of identity into hyper-empirical and objective programmatic Boolean operations of 
true/false, positive/negative. Their overarching aim is to purify, so to speak, the articulations of 
identity from ambivalence and instability while rendering them immune to the problems 
associated with “human fallibility” (Gates 2005, 38), which technically and for so long, had 
made the process of identification by and through human agents/subjects a rather inefficient and 
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unreliable enterprise. Doubtless, however, and despite such attempts, identity continues to be a 
highly contextual, elusive, malleable, ubiquitous, and indeed, complex concept. Therefore, it 
does not lend itself easily to definition nor does it remain unchangeable. As such, any discussion 
about identity and its securitisation needs to be at grips with some of the variations in the 
meaning of identity itself.   
 
“Controversies about personal identity are as old as Western philosophy, not to cite Buddhism 
and Hinduism” (Mordini and Ottolini 2007, 51), and defining who someone is has always been 
a major preoccupation of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the majority of philosophical discourses 
remain, as Arendt and others argue, “unable to determine in words the individual uniqueness of 
a human being” (Kottman 2000, vii) inasmuch as this uniqueness “retains a curious intangibility 
that confounds all efforts toward unequivocal verbal expression” (Arendt in ibid.). In other 
words, who someone is escapes the confines of language and the boundaries of definitions, 
challenging any attempt to complete linguistic appropriation. For this reason, “the moment we 
want to say who someone is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is” (ibid.); 
for example, his qualities and attributes which qualify him as an individual, a citizen, a 
member⎯“as if the task were simply to fill in the content of […] personhood” (Butler 2005, 
31). Or, as Caplan and Torpey (2002, 3) suggest, in the context of identity documentation, “the 
question ‘who is this person?’ leaches constantly into the question ‘what kind of a person is 
this?’” (my italics) This collapse of the “who” into the “what” within the philosophical 
discourses of personhood and identity, as well as within the practices of identification, indicates 
their inherent limitations in capturing the ambiguity of identity and the complexity of the lived 
experience. It is also indicative of “the extent to which traditional philosophy and politics 
respond to universals, rather than to unique persons and their interaction” (Kottman 2000, ix). 
 
As a response to these limitations, various efforts have been devoted to developing more 
nuanced and inclusive accounts that take into consideration the ambivalent and double-sided 
character of identity without conflating the what and the who aspects. In Relating Narratives 
(2000), Adriana Cavarero, for instance, provides an interesting take on the question of identity 
by foregrounding the importance of the notion of “narration,” which, according to her, enables 
the disclosure and preservation of the uniqueness of each life. Inspired by the work of Hannah 
Arendt, Cavarero locates the what element of identity within the realm of philosophy, and the 
who aspect within the realm of biography. She perceives the relation between the two as that of: 
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[a] confrontation between two discursive registers that manifest opposite 
characteristics. One, that of philosophy, has the form of a definitory knowledge that 
regards the universality of Man. The other, that of narration, has the form of a 
biographical knowledge that regards the unrepeatable identity of someone (Cavarero 
2000, 13). 
  
As such, Cavarero differentiates between the biographical or “narratable self”, which is marked 
by and formed through the experience of storytelling, and the traditional “subject” as known 
throughout the metaphysics of subjectivity, with its accompanying concepts of individuality, 
agency, control, and so on. Whereas the latter is continuously caught up within the 
philosophical persistence of “capturing the universal in the trap of definition”, the former 
emerges out of the revelation of “the finite and its fragile uniqueness” through the delicate art of 
narration (ibid., 3). And, through narration, the self is constitutively and continuously exposed 
to others. This exposure, according to Cavarero, is precisely what reveals the singularity and 
“whoness” of a person, and makes the social and political life possible. The uniqueness of 
personal identity, in this sense, is not that which can be derived from a universal substance 
(being a human for example) or reduced to the particular “whatness” of the person (having this 
or that attribute or belonging to this or that category) (see also Agamben (1993), The Coming 
Community). It is rather of a totally expositive, exhibitive and relational character so much so 
that “who each one is, is revealed to others when he or she acts in their presence in an 
interactive theatre where each is, at the same time, actor and spectator” (ibid., 20−22) (see also 
Nancy, Being Singular Plural (2000), especially his discussion on the notion of ‘co-
appearance’). Hence, even the act of telling one’s own story is very much dependent on the 
existence of necessary others. In advancing such an argument, Cavarero is not only challenging 
the supposed sealed interiority of the subject which characterises the individualist doctrine, but 
also the autonomy of traditional autobiography whereby the self turns itself into an “other” in 
order to tell his own story. This other, for Cavarero, is merely “the fantasmatic product of a 
doubling, the supplement of an absence, the parody of a relation” (ibid., 84). In contrast, 
Cavarero’s other is “really an other” whose existence and presence are necessary for 
recognising and designating the uniqueness of the self: 
 
…in the uniqueness of the who there is no homage to the self-centered and titanic 
subject of romanticism. The who does not project or pity herself, and neither does she 
envelop herself within her interiority. The who is simply exposed; or, better, finds 
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herself always already exposed to another, and consists in this reciprocal exposition 
(ibid., 89). 
 
Another useful place, where different concepts of identity are delineated, can be found in the 
work of Marya Schechtman (1990). Schechtman draws a distinction between the question of 
reidentification, as known in psychological-continuity theories and which involves the 
elucidation of “the necessary and sufficient conditions for saying that a person at time t1 is the 
same person as a person at time t2”, and the question of self-knowledge, which refers to the set of 
beliefs and experiences that are expressive of who the person is (Schechtman 1990, 71). So, 
while the first question is concerned with the notion of “sameness” over time and space, the 
second question looks at the “uniqueness” of the person. This distinction is demonstrated by 
Schechtman in the following way: 
 
The question ‘Who am I?’ might be asked by an amnesia victim or by a confused 
adolescent, and requires a different answer in each of these contexts. In the former case, 
the questioner is asking which history her life is a continuation of [(reidentification)], 
and, in the latter, the questioner presumably knows her history but is asking which of 
the beliefs, values, and desires that she seems to have are truly her own, expressive of 
who she is [(self-knowledge)] (ibid., 71). 
 
Like Cavarero, but through a different vocabulary, Schechtman argues that contemporary 
(analytical) philosophical accounts on identity have been predominantly focused on the question 
of reidentification, disregarding the component of self-knowledge, which, she believes, is an 
integral part of one’s coherent self-conception and sense of personal identity. She also suggests 
that the dead-end encountered by psychological-continuity theorists vis-à-vis identity is largely 
due to the conflation of these two questions (ibid., 72) (just as the conflation of the what and the 
who aspects of identity is what marks the irremediable limitations of philosophical discourses of 
identity). In this sense, Schechtman emphasises the importance of attending to the question of 
self-knowledge when addressing the issue of identity. However, and unlike Cavarero’s 
narratable self, which attempts to break away from the metaphysics of subjectivity, 
Schechtman’s articulation of identity as self-knowledge seems to be confined within this very 
metaphysics. As such, Schechtman’s approach, as opposed to Cavarero’s, pays little attention to 
the importance of the notions of exposure and otherness in contributing to the process of self-
knowledge. 
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At this point, one might even raise the objection that the clear-cut differentiation between 
reidentification and self-knowledge is not as pure and absolute as it may seem; and that trying to 
maintain a sharp demarcation line between these concepts runs the risk of resuscitating some 
undesirable forms of dualism. For, in a concrete sense, such concepts constantly leak into each 
other, not least because of the ways in which the experiences of embodiment and the practical 
performance of identity in everyday life remain a matter of continuous contamination, given 
their socio-cultural and political embeddedness. Van der Ploeg (1999a, 40) raises a similar 
argument while framing Schechtman’s two concepts of identity in terms of the difference 
between a third person perspective (entailed in the concept of reidentification) and a first person 
perspective (involved in the question of self-knowledge). She asserts that the absolutisation of 
this difference is underlined by the unwarranted assumption that “there is something like an 
authentic, true self to which the subject has an exclusive, epistemologically privileged access. 
This ignores the social and cultural dimension in identity formation of even the most ‘private’ 
self.” (ibid., 40) And it is precisely this assumption that Cavarero’s approach attempts to 
overcome through the constitutive inclusion of the other in the process of narration⎯or put 
otherwise, through the intertwining and fusion of different person perspectives. Atkins explains 
a similar interrelation in the following way: “who a person is is the named subject of a practical 
and conceptual complex of first-, second- and third-person perspectives which structure and 
unify a life grasped as it is lived’ (Atkins 2004, 347). Correlatively, even Cavarero’s distinction 
between the who and the what aspects of a person is not to be regarded as a sharply 
dichotomous one: who someone “is” is surely affected, to some degree, by what she is⎯even 
when this what element remains indifferent to the bewildering whoness and uniqueness of the 
person. In other words, while the story and the attributes, the who and the what, are by no 
means the same, they do, however, interact beyond a binary or mutually exclusive relation. For 
example, being assigned the identity of a refugee belongs to the sphere of the what, i.e. an 
institutional identity attribution which (dis)qualifies the person as belonging to a certain 
category. What follows from this attribution will have a bearing on the life experience of the 
person, on her story, and hence on her whoness, while narrating one’s life as that of a refugee 
will also inevitably affect the kind of attributions and status the person receives (especially in 
terms of rights, access, obligations, etc.) – and one may also argue that the “story of the 
refugee” would not come into being in the first place were it not for the existence of that 
bounded category of the citizen (which constitutes one of the contents of the what). In such a 
context, the two formulations remain inextricably intertwined. They are both interwoven into 
the fabric of identity and happen within a seemingly recursive movement which contributes to 
the mutual transformation of the two and the forming of a continuum between what and who. 
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Nevertheless, and for the sake of analysis, maintaining a distinction (at least a relative and 
contingent one) between the question of reidentification and the question of self-knowledge, 
between the question of who and the question of what in relation to the notion of identity, may 
help us turn the puzzling problematic of who someone is into an (ethical) opportunity for 
understanding what sort of identity biometrics is concerned with mostly, or as van der Ploeg 
(1999a, 39) puts it, “in what sense ‘identity’ is at stake in biometric identification techniques.”  
 
Reconfiguring identity through biometric technology  
Traditionally, and as far as the process of identification is concerned, there are three major sets 
of characteristics that are used to identify and describe a person:  
 
• What she is (face, voice, etc.) 
• What she knows and uses to identify herself (name, address, social security number, 
etc.) 
• What she has that provides for recognition of her identity (passport, token, etc.) 
(Carblanc 2009, 12, my emphasis). 
 
There is a clear sense in which the remediation1 of these three vectors of identity through the 
introduction of biometric technology retains a fundamental interest in the what element of a 
person, be it in terms of the use of physical attributes (what one is) or the convergence of 
indexical data (what one knows) and biocentric data2 into biometric documents of identification 
(what one has). So in this respect, one might be tempted to argue that the relationship between 
biometrics and identity takes, or rather maintains, a narrow dimension vis-à-vis the question of 
“who someone is”, to the extent that it is based upon the reduction of the person to her 
whatness. Similarly, it can also be argued that biometrics is primarily concerned with the 
                                                
1  I borrow this term from Bolter and Grusin (1999) for whom “a medium is that which remediates. It is that 
which appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of other media and attempts to rival or refashion 
them in the name of the real” (ibid., 65). They also place the body within this dual process of remediation, 
suggesting that the body can function as a medium while being the subject of mediation. Although the authors do 
not address the technology of biometrics as such, I regard their overall formulation as a case in point vis-à-vis 
biometrics. For as mentioned earlier, biometric technology does refashion and thereby remediate its predecessors, 
i.e. prior technologies of identification (anthropometry and fingerprinting for instance), while, at the same time, 
rendering the body as both the medium (the means by which measurement is performed) and the ‘mediated’ (the 
object of measurement), i.e. the remediated.   
2  In his discussion about the implications of biometric technology, Alterman distinguishes between two sets of 
data; biocentric data (e.g. biometric data) and indexical data (e.g. social security number, driver’s license number, 
etc.). While the former is centred on the ‘body’, the latter, on the other hand, has no “internal relation to an 
embodied person; it possesses no property that is tied to our psychological or physical conception of self” 
(Alterman 2003, 144). 
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question of reidentification in which notions such as continuity, coherence and sameness are of 
utmost importance. Schechtman (1990, 71) explains that: 
 
The primary contenders for a criterion of personal identity have been the bodily 
criterion and the psychological criterion, which are based, respectively, on the 
intuitions that it is sameness of body and sameness of personality which are 
responsible for sameness of person. 
   
“Sameness of body”, as it were, conceives the body itself as a constant, able to guarantee a 
certain degree of continuity, stability and permanency across time and space. This type of 
sameness is precisely what biometric technology is interested in⎯at least in the technical sense. 
“Sameness of personality”, on the other hand, involves, to a large extent, the precarious and 
difficult achievement of a coherent personality that is itself very much reliant on the continuity 
and coherence of subjective experience. And, as Mordini and Ottolini (2007, 51) point out, 
“[t]he problem arises when we try to understand whether the subjective experience of this 
coherent personality corresponds to any real object or is just a useful figment.” In this regard, 
biometrics appears as a means of circumventing this “problem” by finding recourse in the body 
itself and turning it into a stabiliser of identity, and by shifting the question of identity from the 
domain of narrative (the story of who someone is) to that of templates (digital samples of one’s 
biological data).  
 
Parenthetically, however, it is not that the body is absent from the second notion of sameness, 
i.e. sameness of personality and its relation to subjective experience. Quite the contrary. The 
body, as we learnt through the different strands of phenomenology and the extensive feminist 
literature (and indeed through our own personal experiences), is an integral part of one’s 
experience and awareness of being-in-the-world. But there remains a crucial difference in terms 
of the ways in which the body itself is perceived in both sameness of body and sameness of 
personality. At risk of oversimplifying, we can postulate that in the first model of sameness, the 
body has the status of an object amenable to abstraction, measurement, digitisation, storage, 
distribution, etc. The relationship between identity and the body in this instance is of an external 
order. That is to say, the person is regarded as having a body that remains more or less the same 
throughout life and upon which many activities can be exercised (biometric identification for 
instance). Whereas in the second model of sameness, the body is regarded as a subject through 
which the world is lived and experience is made possible. Atkins (2000, 337) argues, in 
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phenomenological terms, that “there can be a lived world only because my body is itself part of 
the world which it experiences.”  
 
The latter model has much resonance with what Paul Ricoeur (1992) refers to as ipseity. 
Ricoeur situates the notion of identity within the dialectic of idem and ipse; sameness and 
selfhood. Idem-identity involves something similar to that which is implied by the notion of 
sameness of body, particularly in its consideration of the body as a constant entity that can be 
compared to other entities outside time variants. It corresponds to “the notion of identification, 
understood in the sense of reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the 
same thing twice, n times” (Ricoeur 1992, 116; see also Ceyhan  2008, 116). In so doing, idem-
identity assumes some principle of “uninterrupted continuity and permanence in time” (ibid., 
117). It can take the form of numerical identity, which indicates oneness and unity as opposed 
to plurality and diversity (e.g. passport or ID card number), or qualitative identity, which stands 
for extreme resemblance and interchangeability (e.g. x and y wearing identical clothes) (ibid., 
116, 122).3 For Ricoeur, this version of identity, which takes as its premise the sameness of 
body and the cardinal notion of reidentification, inevitably results in the increased concealment 
of selfhood. “And this will be the case as long as the characteristics related to possessive 
pronouns and adjectives (“my,” “mine”) have not been connected to the explicit problematic of 
the self” (Ricoeur 1992, 33). That is to say, as long as the relation of body to identity remains 
contained within and reduced to an external order of ownership, i.e. having a body.            
 
Ipse-identity, on the other hand, is about selfhood and involves the biographic, embodied, 
temporal, and narrative dimension of who someone is. Rather than being an emblem of 
constancy or a datum of sameness, the body, in ipse-identity, is regarded as an attestation to 
selfhood itself; as “the most overwhelming testimony in favor of the irreducibility of selfhood to 
sameness” (ibid., 128). Much like Cavarero, Ricoeur acknowledges the vital importance of 
otherness and the constitutive role of relationality to the formation and (narrative) formulation 
of ipseity. He also lodges similar complaints against “cogito philosophies” and metaphysical 
discourses of identity in terms of their substitution of the question of who for the question of 
what and the ensuing eclipsing of the question of selfhood and its uniqueness. To this end, 
Ricoeur regards the self-attesting dimension of ipseity as a means of protecting the question of 
who from such a misleading substitution. He writes: “[i]t is self-attestation that, at every 
level⎯linguistic, praxic, narrative, and prescriptive⎯will preserve the question “who?” from 
being replaced by the questions “what?” or “why?” Conversely, at the center of the aporia, only 
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the persistence of the question “who?”⎯in a way laid bare for lack of response⎯will reveal 
itself to be the impregnable refuge of attestation” (ibid., 23). In this sense, then, attestation, in 
all its polysemic and polymorphous forms, including those of narrativity and embodiment, is 
very much reliant on whoness for its own actualisation and subsistence, just as the question of 
who remains dependent on attestation for its own revelation and survival. This binding kinship 
between the two is precisely where the ethical plane unfolds, according to Ricoeur.   
 
From all the above considerations emerges a series of intricate questions, questions that cannot 
be sidestepped if we are to understand the relationship between biometrics and 
identity⎯especially if we assume the phenomenological inseparability of body and identity: 
where does the biometric body stand here? Does it merely belong to the realms of the what and 
the idem, or does it straddle both the who and the what; the idem and the ipse? Is it merely an 
object of abstraction, comparison, matching, and reidentification, or does it gesture towards a 
less reductionist and a more complex vision?  
 
To be sure, the (re)turn to the body for the establishment of identity in biometric technology 
seems almost like an ironic twist vis-à-vis Cartesian dualism. For while the Cartesian imaginary 
is underlined by the (erroneous) belief that consciousness is detached from the body, that the 
body has little relevance to identity, and that it is an impediment to objectivity, biometric 
technology, on the other hand, lays claim to the idea that identity can “objectively” be 
determined through the body and in ways that are somewhat independent of consciousness.  
 
En ce XXIe siècle, le corps prend sa revanche. C’est à lui que l’époque moderne confie 
la tâche de livrer l’identité de la personne, de dire qui est qui et qui, par conséquent, a 
le droit d’entrer.  
[In this 21st century, the body takes its revenge. It is in the body that the contemporary 
epoch entrusts the task of delivering personal identity, to say who is who and who, as 
a result, has the right to access.] (my translation)4  
           Valo 2006, 21 
 
One may quibble here about whether this reversal of status is truly a revenge. In a slight sense, 
it is, insofar as “biometrics gives the body unprecedented relevance over the mind” (Aas 2006, 
                                                
4  And here, we should stress again that the use of the body in the domain of identity/identification is not unique 
to 21st century nor to biometric technology.    
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154). “I think therefore I am” becomes “I am I” (Lash in ibid., 155), or rather, “I am that”5 (that 
name; that fingerprint; that hand pattern; that face scan; etc.), where “I” is heavily reliant on 
“that” and “that” is heavily reliant on the body and its algorithmic representations to assert the 
person’s (official) identity. And, instead of being relegated to the status of the “container of the 
soul” as in Cartesian dualism, the body is now being treated as the forensic dust of identity, as 
the crystal ball through which the astrologists of identity seek to predict potential risk and future 
dangerousness. The body, as such, is increasingly regarded as “a source of instant ‘truth’” (Aas 
2006, 154) encapsulated in the expression “the body does not lie”, a catchphrase that has so 
conveniently been marketed by biometrics industry. But this instant truth is merely a truth about 
the body qua body-data. It is a truth that excludes the tale of the body, that is to say, its narrative 
and biographical dimension, without which a person can hardly maintain a sense of whoness 
and (temporal) coherence.  
 
In fact, the entire philosophy of biometric technology is based upon an epistemic suspicion 
towards the story. It is based upon the belief that “the mind is deceiving while the body is 
‘truthful’” (ibid.). For this reason, when the biometric body speaks, it speaks in a language that 
silences the biographical story of the person whose body is ordered to speak. It therefore 
occludes the echo of whoness while merely revealing the trace of whatness. As Aas (2006, 154) 
explains: 
 
A talking individual, who owns the body, is in fact seen as unnecessary and, even more 
importantly, insufficient for identification. Now only the body can talk in the required 
ways, through the unambiguous and cryptic language of codes and algorithms. When a 
body provides the password, a world of information opens. Databases begin to talk. On 
the other hand, when the individual talks, the words are only met with suspicion.   
 
So in this respect, although biometrics seems to be reversing the internal order of Cartesian 
dualism by giving supremacy to the body over the mind, it is still sustaining, to some extent, a 
similar dualism between the two by doing just that. If Cartesian dualism, as we know it, has a 
tendency to disregard the fact that mind requires body, biometric dualism has a tendency to 
disregard the fact that body requires mind. According to Mordini and Ottolini (2007, 54), 
“[b]ody requires mind, not in the trivial sense that you need a neurological system to animate 
the body, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our body is communicational […] 
We do not just need words. We are words made flesh.” In this regard, biometrics can be 
                                                
5  Thanks to Nikolas Rose for this formulation.  
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considered as yet another instance whereby the unity of mind and body is negated. And 
although biometric technology recognises the fact that bodies are indeed biographies, it hardly 
offers an outlet for listening to those biographies. For the knowledge it produces is not based on 
“mutual communication,” but on “one-way observation. It is clearly knowledge marked by a 
power relation” (Aas 2006, 153).  
 
Furthermore, this reversal of status does not necessarily amount to the body’s escape from the 
status of the object. For although biometric technology places bodies centre stage, these bodies 
are “already defined merely in terms of their sameness to other data” (Lyon 2008, 507). As 
mentioned earlier, establishing sameness of body is a paramount preoccupation of biometric 
technology. And to fulfil this task, the body is turned into an informational object, a readable 
text (or rather palimpsest) for statistical (re)measurements and data storage. At the same time, 
however, it should be borne in mind that biometrics is not simply about verifying a pre-given or 
pre-registered identity by measuring the sameness of body (one-to-one match). If that were the 
case, biometrics would then be “an innocent technological practice that only in a rather trivial 
sense is concerned with personal identity” (van der Ploeg 1999a, 40). Rather, biometrics is also 
about identifying and distinguishing one person from another, not just in a technical sense (one-
to-many match), but in a much broader way wherein technology itself becomes actively 
involved in creating and establishing identities.  Homi Bhabha (1994, 64) reminds us that: 
 
the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a 
self-fulfilled prophecy⎯it is always the production of an image of identity and the 
transformation of the subject in assuming that image.  
 
 Balibar (1995, 187), in fact, goes to the extent to suggest that: 
 
In reality there are no identities, only identifications: either with the institution itself, 
or with other subjects by the intermediary of the institution. Or, if one prefers, 
identities are only the ideal goal of processes of identification, their point of honor, of 
certainty or uncertainty of their consciousness, thus their imaginary referent.  
 
This, to be sure, is true of the case of biometric identification. At first glance, and partially at 
least, Balibar’s proposition, that there is no identity; only identification, seems to reverberate 
closely with the biometric project. For the latter appears to be, more often than not, driven by the 
quest for identification/authentication rather than identity itself (see also Muller 2004). Not that 
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the ideal of identity completely evaporates in the midst of biometric processes. Rather, identity 
and identification seem to be implicated in a relationship of interdependency wherein 
identification functions as a process of construction through which forms (or images, to use 
Bhabha’s term) of identity come into being (the production of the refugee identity for example)., 
while the (re)establishment of identity remains as that which provides the impetus and 
justification for the raison d’être of identification techniques. At this point, and by way of 
illustrating the above arguments, I would like to invoke a couple of examples, namely the 
European Eurodac project and the UK biometric Application Registration Cards (ARC).  
 
Eurodac project is a European Union initiative aimed at facilitating the implementation of the 
1990 Dublin Convention concerning the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for the examination of an asylum application (European Union 2006). The 
Convention was established in the context of developing a common and harmonised European 
asylum system. It is governed by the “authorisation principle” (Hurwitz 1999, 648), which lays 
down the rule that the State of first entry would be the one and the only Member State who has 
total jurisdiction in and responsibility for the asylum application. The Eurodac project was 
proposed in 1997 and went live in 2003 as a response to the problem of determining applicants’ 
prior stay in other Member States, with the view to provide a solution to the phenomenon of so-
called “asylum shopping” (van der Ploeg 1999b, 298; Koslowski 2003, 9). 
 
Underlying the Eurodac project is a supranational cybernetic network: an EU-wide database 
which is “the first common Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) within the 
European Union” (European Commission 2005b). It contains the digital fingerprints of every 
person over the age of 14 who is claiming asylum in one of the EU countries (ibid.). Prior to 
assigning any given asylum application to a caseworker, the applicant’s fingerprints are taken 
and matched against other digitised fingerprints that are stored on the central database. The 
purpose of this biometric process is to establish whether an applicant has already tried claiming 
asylum at another border crossing. If a match is found, the applicant will then be subject to 
deportation to the country of the first application if not to the third country of origin.  
 
In October 2001, and part of the overhaul in asylum and immigration policy, the UK Home 
Office announced the introduction of Applicant Registration Cards (ARCs) for individuals 
claiming asylum in the UK (Telegraph 30 Oct. 2001). The ARC, also known as “asylum smart 
ID card”, is a biometric identity card containing the personal details of the asylum applicant 
(name, date of birth, photograph, etc.) and a memory chip with his/her fingerprints (prior to the 
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introduction of ARCs, applicants for asylum were issued with a Standard Acknowledgement 
Letter (SAL), a paper-based document of identification. Given its format, it is claimed (Home 
Office 2002, 54) that the SAL has been easily susceptible to forgery and counterfeiting). The 
aim of introducing ARCs is to provide a more reliable and tamper-proof means of identification 
by fixing the identity of the asylum seeker to his/her body in order to prevent the occurrences of 
double-dipping (claiming benefits under multiple identities) and the abuse of the welfare 
system. The ARC must be presented in a number of situations and everyday transactions, 
including the reporting procedure, claiming support at the Post Office, accessing health care, 
etc. Those who refuse to comply⎯by not carrying the ARC⎯are automatically disqualified 
from state support and might be subject to detention. The ARC is thus part of the overall 
strategies of tightening control over the provision of social services and benefits to asylum 
seekers, and ensuring that they do not “disappear from the system.” 
 
What the above two examples indicate, is precisely how biometric procedures contribute to the 
establishment of identity rather than merely the verification of a pre-given one, that is to say, 
how biometrics is “not merely descriptive, but constitutive of identity” (van der Ploeg 2009, 88). 
In the case of the Eurodac programme, biometric technology is used as a means of scanning 
bodies for signs and proofs of illegality, falsehood and “irregular existence” within the territory. 
It is used to determine the boundary between the genuine and the bogus, between the legitimate 
and the illegitimate, between the credible and the fabricated, and to distinguish the polis from 
“what does not ‘properly’ belong to it” (Zylinska 2004, 526). In fact, what lies at the heart of 
such procedures is the institutional and governmental will to bypass other more organic methods 
of verifying identity (including the story that is told by the applicant, language analysis, 
psychological assessment, etc.) insofar as these methods are perceived as contingent and 
insufficient: “If a person shows up with nothing with them but the clothes they wear and the 
story they offer, it would, of course, be a golden solution to be able to produce from the 
person’s body an identity” (van der Ploeg 1999b, 300, emphasis added). The following snapshot 
is a case in point:  
 
Bango carries no passport, shouts “asylum!”, and claims to come from Sierra Leone. 
The immigration service interrogates him and lets him take a ‘Sierra Leone exam.’ 
Which ethnic group lives in the North-East? What is the name of the largest shopping 
street in Freetown? Bango fails his exam, the immigration service rejects his 
application for asylum. He appeals and keeps claiming to come from Sierra Leone. 
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This, like coming from Angola or Afghanistan, would entitle him to a temporary 
residence permit. The judge does not believe his story (in ibid., 297). 
 
Moreover, in the case of Applicant Registration Cards, and to appropriate van der Ploeg’s 
(1999b, 296) argument, “the bodies of cardholders will become inscribed with their identities as 
[asylum seekers… and] implicated in the distribution of benefits, services, and rights.” Rose 
(1999, 240) argues that within contemporary forms of control, there are certain strategies that 
“seek to incorporate the excluded […] and to re-attach them to the circuits of civility” and 
others that “accept the inexorability of exclusion of certain individuals […] and seek to manage 
this population.” Applicant Registration Cards can be seen to be executing precisely, and 
concurrently, these very functions. For not only do they constitute, and indeed institute, the 
condition for gaining access to social services as an asylum seeker (inclusion within the nexus 
of sociality), but also demarcate the latter as an alien, a non-citizen, multiplying “the possible 
loci of [inclusive] exclusion” (ibid., 243). The function of ARCs as a re-attaching agent is at 
once a function of attachment as well as detachment, a function of inclusion as well as 
exclusion: through his/her ARC, the asylum seeker is connected (precariously that is) to the 
order of civility only to be reminded that s/he does not belong to it, s/he is allowed to perform a 
certain form of inclusion only to endure another sense of exclusion. This double function of 
asylum smart ID cards is hence reminiscent of the fact that, in the domain of asylum 
management, the question of identification becomes a matter of knowledge production à la 
Foucault.  
 
In these examples, we can therefore observe how identity comes into being through the 
paraphernalia of technical procedures such as those of biometric technology. It “becomes that 
which results from these efforts” (van der Ploeg 1999b, 300); an identity that is at once 
“independent” of the story of the person, and yet “undeniably belonging to that person” (ibid.). 
Circling back to the issue of the biometric body, we may suggest that in certain contexts, as in 
the problem field of asylum, the body becomes more than a mere object of measurement and 
scanning, but a subject par excellence from which identity emerges⎯at times, against the will 
and beyond the choice of the person. Through biometric identification, the raw instant truth that 
is distilled from the body during the procedure of enrolment is processed further and turned into 
a refined truth. This refined truth forms the basis for processes of profiling, sorting and 
categorisation. It also tells a story, the story about “how many times an individual has crossed a 
border or attempted to enter a country illegally, about an individual’s DNA profile […] how old 
he or she really is” (Aas 2006, 153). Ostensibly, however, this story hardly relates to “personal 
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knowledge about people and the causes of their actions” (ibid., my italics) insofar as it is a story 
told from the one-dimensional perspective of the machine/the operator. It excludes ipseity. This 
constitutes perhaps both the failure and the dream of biometrics: failure to/dream of access(ing) 
the nexus of the whoness of the person where intentions, actions, beliefs, values, experiences, 
and, indeed, resistance reside. 
  
This is especially the case vis-à-vis the deployment of biometrics as a technology of pre-emption 
and risk profiling not only in the domain of asylum and immigration but within the overarching 
fields of securitisation and surveillance as a whole. What lies at the heart of biometric profiling 
mechanisms is the technostalgic dream of monitoring the future by revising the past and 
redefining the present (Gates 2005). Systems such as Eurodac and the Schengen Information 
System are epitomes of these pre-emptive techniques of control in that not only do they store 
and monitor data relating to asylum and visa applications, but also construct predictive profiles, 
patterns of actions, and maps of behavioural comparison and dispositions with the aim to 
obstruct the flux of movement of those who are likely to become potential or repeat offenders 
(the common rule in the Schengen visa system is that if an individual has overstayed her visa in 
one Member State, it is unlikely that she will be granted access again to the EU area for a period 
of five years. The same principle is applied to cases of deportation which can extend to a ten-
year ban period). The optimisation of such techniques of control relies on the governing of 
identity by means of capturing the singularity of the body insofar as the latter is regarded as a 
way of outwitting the mind of those who might have dubious intentions (bogus asylum claims, 
multiple asylum applications, use of fake travel documents, etc.) and managing their movement 
at a distance. Biometrics in this context functions according to a logic of mistrust and suspicion 
whereby the foreign other is often regarded as a dubious other by default until proven otherwise 
through biometric identification. Paradoxically, it remains the ultimate dream of biometric 
control to be able to access that which it attempts to outwit and remove from the equation, that 
is, the mind and with it the purposes, motivations, intentions, etc. that lie behind actions 
(whether actual or potential), this, in an attempt to fulfil its security aspirations of a “total 
knowledge” paradigm which can then be converted into a more fine-grained and target-oriented 
knowledge to reduce future uncertainties into calculable and manageable programmes of pre-
emption. Yet such a dream of total control remains merely ‘the utopia of the perfectly governed 
city’, to borrow Foucault’s (1975, 198) phrase. For one thing, in reducing singularity and 
uniqueness to sameness, biometrics merely manages to gain a partial and narrow view on 
identity which, despite all technical efforts, can never render the unknown absolutely known or 
the unidentifiable totally identifiable. Additionally, and to use Hayter’s (2000, 152) apt 
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metaphor, any form of control or closure is “like a dam; when one hole is blocked, another one 
appears somewhere else.” As argued elsewhere (Ajana 2006, 261), acts of clandestine migration 
are strong illustrations of this metaphor insofar they expose the intrinsic porousness of borders 
and the unavoidable limitations of technology. They are, in fact, pure manifestations of 
singularity in that they resist the confines of technical identification, force open the shields of 
territorial containment and refuse to succumb to the hindering of circulation imposed by 
(over)developed countries. They are a valid attestation that the world is a place made out of 
relations and exposures where “there has to be a clinamen [;] an inclination or an inclining from 
one toward the other, of one by the other, or from one to the other” (Nancy 1991, 3). In the 
culture of suspicion and distrust that governs and underpins the field of securitisation and 
biometric identification, there is hardly a space for this logic of clinamen to the extent that the 
figure of the nation-state (despite its putative erosion) is often imagined as an autonomous, self-
sufficient entity whose exposure is merely that which relates to exteriority in terms of neoliberal 
principles and advanced capitalist criteria. With regard to immigration and asylum policy in the 
UK, this modality of governing translates into various business-driven schemes such as the 
“Highly Skilled Migrant Programme” and “Sector Based Scheme” as well as the phenomenon of 
“cherry picking of refugees on grounds of skills and potential for assimilation rather than need 
for protection” (Yuval-Davies et al. 2005, 518).  
 
Against these rationalities of thinking and governing, clandestine migration stands as a strong 
form of resistance, as the vanguard of self-asserting mobility rights, and therefore, as an 
indicator of the inescapable failure of biometrics to be totally in control of movement. This 
however should not give one a reason to romanticise or fetishise such a form of migration. For 
precarious mobility is less about intentional choice and more about despair, hardship, and the 
legitimate need for protection. More importantly, it is a reminder and a testimony of the 
symbolic and material violence embedded within the current biopolitics of immigration which, 
in exposing some populations to life-threatening experiences, ends up producing death through 
policy and rendering the border as “the exemplary theatre for staging the spectacle of the “illegal 
alien” that the law produces” (De Genova in Amoore 2006, 34). Whilst this violence is not 
necessarily the intention or the objective of the neoliberal style of managing movement, it is 
nevertheless a by-product, if not even a constitutive element, of the dual modality of governing 
through freedom and governing through mistrust, which produces caesuras within the 
population-body (Foucault 2003 [1976]) by dividing it into various categories that are amenable 
to different treatment and uneven regulation – the most obvious one being the division between 
the “responsible citizen” and the “abject other” (both of which subsume further sub-divisions 
 20 
and fragmentations). As van Munster (2005, 5-6) argues, “the prosperity of society as a whole 
[…] involves the abjection of those that are considered self-abasing. [I]n the rationality of 
advanced liberalism, illegality is understood as a deliberate life choice, which in turn is seen as 
expressing irresponsibility and dishonesty on the part of the undocumented immigrant. 
[W]hereas humanitarian discourse generally represents the behaviour of illegal immigrants as 
acts of despair, discourses of advanced liberalism construct illegality as the irresponsible 
conduct of autonomy.” What remains at issue, then, is the notion of freedom (and by extension 
the notion of equality as well), exercise of which (at the border) has become a matter of 
privilege and flexibility for some and an uncanny and deadly experience for others. “Who pays 
the cost of freedom for the mobility of others?” (Salter in Sparke 2006: 169) is thus a highly 
important and urgent question for which an entire ethico-politics, based on hospitality (Derrida), 
responsibility (Levinas), openness (Nancy), and justice (Ricoeur), needs to be devised and 
ultimately mobilised. 
 
Deleuze (1992) is undoubtedly right in suggesting that in control society, individuals are turned 
into “dividuals”; bits and numbers scattered around databases and identified by their pins, 
profiles, credit scoring, etc., rather than their subjectivities (see also Rose 1999, 234). Aas (2006, 
155) makes a similar argument in the following way: “[t]echnological systems no longer address 
persons as ‘whole persons’ with a coherent, situated self and a biography, but rather make 
decisions on the bases of singular signs, such as a fingerprint.” This dividuation has, indeed, 
much resonance with biometric technology. In fact, biometrics goes a step further. It facilitates 
the reassembling of those bodily bits in a movement that can be imagined as electronic suturing 
whereby identities are stitched up or designed from scratch in order to imbue those profiles with 
a life of their own (a life that might even negate, wipe out, or at least, momentarily override the 
lived life of the person under scrutiny, as it is often the case with asylum seekers). And through 
this movement, resubjectification can take place and individuality can (re)emerge again, 
producing what might be called a recombinant identity. It is a quasi-artificial, but by no means 
disembodied, identity generated through the combining of various data and whose actualisation 
and institutionalisation certainly interfere with and affect the life course and the personal “story-
to-come.” Some aspects of this notion of recombinant identity resemble Haggerty’s and 
Ericson’s (2000) notion of “data doubles” by which they refer to the process of breaking down 
and abstracting the body into a series of data. Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between 
the two. Whereas data doubles mainly designate a “decorporealized body” and an “abstract” type 
of individuality that is comprised of “pure virtuality” and “pure information” (Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000, 611−614), recombinant identity connotes mainly the “actuality” of re-
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individuation; that is to say, the terminal point at which data recombine into an identity in the 
concrete, corporeal and material sense. And, never, at any stage, does the notion of recombinant 
identity consider the body as purely virtual, decorporealised, disembodied or immaterial.  
 
For these reasons, one might justly express a reluctance towards the suggestion that biometrics 
is merely about the what aspect of the person, or that it is simply concerned with the idem 
element of identity. For, although biometric technology does not seem to be making much 
attempt to access whoness and ipseity (or perhaps cannot do so6), it does, nevertheless, flirt with 
them, and at times, forcibly so. Not so much in terms of its identificatory objectives which 
remain fixated on what can be distilled from bodily particularities, and even less so in terms of 
the specificity of its technical procedures (assuming here Heidegger’s proposition that “the 
essence of technology is nothing technological”). But certainly in terms of its wide-reaching 
outcomes, and especially, in terms of the way in which it ends up partaking of processes and 
practices that impose certain recombinant identities and thereby affect the embodied existence of 
the person. This is particularly true of marginalised groups, such as asylum seekers, whose life 
stories are continuously being shaped by their Sisyphean interactions with bureaucratic 
institutions and the forms of whatness that are often imposed upon them as a result of such 
interactions. As Bauman (2004, 13) rightly argues:  
 
‘Identities’ float in the air, some of one’s own choice but others inflated and launched 
by those around, and one needs to be constantly on the alert to defend the first against 
the second; there is a heightened likelihood of misunderstanding, and the outcome of 
the negotiation forever hangs in the balance.   
 
Here, indeed, lies in the (bio)ethical challenge of biometric technology. The challenge to defend 
ispe-identity, that self-attesting dimension of who someone is, from institutional 
impositions⎯especially when those who “inflate” and “launch” enforced forms of identity are 
chiefly the politicians, policy makers, technical experts, industry representatives, and other 
administrators without responsibility, to put it in Arendtian terms, who, in the name of security 
and public interest, gather together to decide which identities are worthy of the name and which 
identities are disposable, implausible, if not even exterminatable. In this sense, the challenge is 
certainly that of making room, no matter how small and humble it is, for narrative, for self-
                                                
6      Even the new generation of biometric technology which claims to be able to ‘read the mind’ remains unable to 
predict who someone is. See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1060972/The-airport-security-scanner-
read-mind.html 
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attestation, for ipseity, for stories, in order to interrupt the substantialist formulations of identity 
and their accompanying myth of communal essence and foundational origins (see Nancy 1991)7.  
It is the challenge of replacing the “at distance” of the technological8 with the “up close”9 of the 
personal, of “listening” to the body instead of “reading” off the body, and of confronting the 
technicist and stodgy zeal for sameness with the delicate and affective touch of whoness.   
 
Narrative bioethics of biometrics  
Doubtless, the dissolving of the question of who into the question of what, of which Arendt, 
Cavarero, Ricoeur, et al. speak, has had a profound and significant impact on the field of ethics 
itself. More specifically, it has certainly been instrumental to the inauguration and upholding of 
the universalistic and foundational principles upon which the mainstream styles of ethics have 
been calibrated, and in defining in advance what counts and qualifies as an ethical issue in the 
first place. This is so inasmuch as the focus on the what instead of the who, on the abstract 
universality of Man instead of the fleshy and situated singularity of the person, has led to the 
foregrounding of rational, meta-theoretical, top-down and rights-based forms of ethics, and 
thereby disregarding contextual, situational and emotive approaches (see Haimes 2002 and 
Hedgecoe 2004). Of course, the reductionist principalism and utilitarianism of mainstream 
ethics has not remained unchallenged. In fact, the last few decades have witnessed burgeoning 
attempts, within various fields and disciplines, to rethink ethics beyond the narrow contours of 
moral theory and outside the abstract ambit of generic principalism. This has particularly, but by 
no means exclusively, been the case vis-à-vis the fields of biomedicine and biotechnology 
whereby the interface between life/body and ethics is staged most explicitly. One notable 
example of such attempts has been the growing adoption of narrative approaches within the 
interdisciplinary realm of bioethics.        
 
Narrative bioethics, as the name suggests, can be described as a form of ethics that takes the 
notion of narrative as both the ground and the object of ethical reflection and moral justification 
when addressing issues surrounding life and its technologies. Echoing Rita Charon, a physician 
                                                
7  Interestingly, for Jean-Luc Nancy, one way of interrupting such substantialist discourses (for example, 
citizenship, individuality, community, etc.) is through literature and writing which bring to the fore the singularity 
of each and everyone, and resist forms of identitarianism and fusion (be they political, national, societal, or 
otherwise). And, Ricoeur (1992, 115) describes literature as  “a vast laboratory […] through which narrativity 
serves as a propaedeutic to ethics.” 
8  Most of the current technological developments are geared towards this dimension of “at distance”.  
Ironically, their performance is often measured and judged by how much distance they can flatten as well as how 
much distance they can guarantee and maintain. Some touch devices are in fact designed to eliminate touch.  
Notice, for instance, next time you board a London bus and touch your Oyster Travelcard, that there is no more 
need to address or even “look” at the bus driver. Just “scan and go”, thus is the way! 
9  See also “Introduction” in Nelson (1997), Stories and their limits.  
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and literary scholar, Arras (1997, 70) describes this ethics as “a mode of moral analysis that is 
attentive to and critically reflective about the narrative elements of our experience.” The import 
of this ethical style into the biomedical and biotechnological field, for instance, has been 
productively used to challenge the authority of traditional medical ethics by bringing to the fore 
the complexities and nuances of patients’ stories, and to enhance physicians’ responsiveness 
towards their patients’ suffering instead of taking refuge in the guise of professionalism, 
objectivity and medical detachment (Brody 1997; Montello 1997). 
 
Much of the conceptual underpinning of narrative bioethics is informed by the work of 
hermeneutics, wherein a special emphasis is placed upon the importance of interpretation as an 
ethical activity and a means of moral evaluation. The practical advantage of hermeneutics, 
Stepnisky (2007, 198) explains, lies in the way in which it allows us to “understand the 
interpretive process that unfolds in the encounter between self and other.” It also lies in its 
ability to provide a valuable means for countering, or at least complementing, those positions 
which “too quickly leave behind the problem of selfhood, and the more intimate forms of self-
interpretation” (ibid., 199). Importantly, such a process of interpretation is by no means 
complete nor does it strive to achieve a stable meaning. Rather, it remains open to incessant 
reinterpretation and expandability. “This emphasis on the ongoing interpretability of things,” 
according to Stepnisky, “should ease any fears that hermeneutics, despite its appeal to self-
understanding, seeks a stable autonomous self” (ibid., 198).  
 
At the methodological level, there are many ways in which narrative can be used to critically 
address the field of bioethics. Nelson (1997, x), for example, cites five approaches of doing so: 
reading stories; telling stories; comparing stories; literary analysis; and invoking stories. In each 
of these methods, narrative is regarded as a heuristic device for cultivating ethical imagination 
and enriching the moral landscape. It is not the place here to discuss in great depth and detail the 
particularities, advantages and limitations of such techniques. Suffice, for the purpose of the 
present paper and within the limit of the remaining space, to say a preliminary word or two 
about how a narrative approach can help us rethink the bioethics of biometrics, specifically in 
relation to the case of asylum and along the lines of what has been discussed hitherto with 
regard to Cavarero’s and Ricoeur’s aforementioned arguments. 
 
As stated at the outset, recent debates on the ethical implications of biometric technology have 
been largely dominated by rights-centric discourses and permeated with a series of blanket terms 
such as those of privacy, dignity, and liberty. They, therefore, remain implicated within the very 
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same universalistic approaches to ethics, and confined to the very same reductionist definitions 
of identity in which the question of who is all too often diluted into the question of what. Given 
its strong engagement with the issue of whoness, one may hope that a narrative approach to 
bioethics can act as an antidote to practices, including those of biometric identification, that seek 
to simplify and fix the notion of identity and deprive selfhood of its story. This, however, should 
not be considered as a methodological bid to overtake mainstream approaches to the ethics of 
biometrics, nor as a means of erecting a divide between them. Instead, the inclusion of a 
narrative fibre into the principal dietary regimes of those approaches may help rendering them 
more mindful and, indeed, “bodyful”10 of the ethical force residing in the person’s petit récit 
insofar as “[n]arrative provides us with a rich tapestry of fact, situation, and character on which 
our moral judgements operate” (Arras 1997, 82). 
 
Returning to the issue of asylum, it is often argued that one major challenge facing immigration 
authorities and the like is the management of individuals who possess no documents of identity: 
“police officers are particularly frustrated over all the identityless asylum seekers of various 
ethnic origins which are totally out of control” (Aftenposten in Aas 2006, 147). This notion of 
“identityless asylum seekers,” as Aas explains, is underlined by the assumption that “identity is 
something detached from one’s self” and that these asylum seekers “do not have the kind of 
identity required by state bureaucracy: a stable, objective, unambiguous and thing-like identity.” 
In fact, this notion represents an instance of what Ricoeur (1992, 149) calls “man without 
properties”11 who “becomes ultimately nonidentifiable in a world [...] of qualities (or properties) 
without men.” However, contra the anxiety-inducing formulations of immigration authorities, 
nonidentifiability and lack of properties (documents of identity in our case), in the Ricoeurian 
sense, are not necessarily tantamount to a source of frustration and threat. They rather represent 
“moments of extreme destitution” whereby “the empty response to the Question ‘Who am I?’ 
[i.e. ‘I am no one for I possess no attributes, no papers’] refers not to nullity but to the nakedness 
of the question itself” (ibid., 166−7). They therefore constitute a remarkable opportunity12 for 
“exposing selfhood by taking away the support of sameness” (ibid., 149). 
 
In this respect, whereas the practice of biometric identification covers up the nakedness of the 
question “who?” by giving it back the flimsy veil of sameness, a narrative bioethics seeks to 
maintain and perpetuate this state of nakedness by reintroducing the character of ipseity at the 
heart of identity. In so doing, this ethics places “the demand for recognition of the ipse” (ibid.: 
                                                
10  I am borrowing this concept from Megan Clinch. 
11  appropriating the title of Robert Musil's novel The Man without Qualities. 
12  although a painful one, given the circumstances that push one to seek asylum. 
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96) while revealing the fact that “not only […] who appears to us is shown to be unique in 
corporeal form and sound of voice [elements that can be captured through biometric technology], 
but that this who also already comes to us perceptibly as a narratable self with a unique story” 
(Cavarero 2000, 34). As such, this ethics is primarily an ethics of responsibility towards the 
story. It is an ethics of listening and “suffering-with” (Ricoeur 1992, 190); an ethics of sympathy 
that is “distinct from simple pity, in which the self is secretly pleased to know it has been spared” 
(ibid., 191).  
 
For Ricoeur, following the line of the Arendtian thesis, the question “who?” is inextricably linked 
to the notion of action, and action is precisely that which calls for narration as a means of saving 
itself from the abyss of oblivion and saving “the reciprocal exhibitions of the actors from the 
fragile actuality of the present to which they belong” (Cavarero 2000, 26). To this notion of 
action, Ricoeur (1992, 18) also adds the notion of suffering, linking narrative identity and its 
ethical dimension to “the broader concept of the acting and suffering individual.” As Marta 
(1997, 204) puts it: “[t]he ‘one who acts’ is also the ‘one who suffers’⎯joy, pain, sorrow, 
triumph, defeat. The ‘one who acts,’ who suffers, bears the ethical and moral responsibility of his 
or her actions in relation to another and to others.”  
 
It goes without saying that fleeing prosecution and danger is perhaps one of the most powerful 
examples of acting and suffering13: “[t]o flee is to produce the real, to create life, to find a 
weapon,” according to Deleuze (in Nyers 2003, 1069). Small wonder, then, the issue of asylum 
has become an “acid test” for both politics and ethics (Diken 2004, 83), and a strong reminder of 
the limitations that inhere to the institutionally imposed identity ascriptions. Seen from the 
vantage point of narrative bioethics, the identity of the person seeking asylum cannot be 
dissociated from her embodied experience nor can her singularity be extracted merely from the 
collection of body-data. Rather, the identity of the person becomes the identity of the story itself, 
an identity recounted and exposed in the presence of another, namely the immigration officer. 
This scene of exposition and narrativity constitutes the ethical plane of relationality upon which 
ipseity reveals itself, and with it, the role played by feelings. “For it is indeed feelings that are 
revealed in the self by the other’s suffering, as well as by the moral injunction coming from the 
other, feelings spontaneously directed toward others” (Ricoeur 1992, 192).  
 
                                                
13  Here, suffering is not to be understood solely in a negative sense, but as an entire spectrum of experiences and 
affects including those of resistance, defiance and transgression (of borders and interiority for instance).     
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Therefore, to replace the story with the template, to replace listening with scanning, is akin to 
amputating the possibility of “feeling with” (Marta 1997, 206) and castrating the opportunity of 
exposing selfhood and uniqueness. Moreover, not only does the paradigm of biometric 
identification trample upon the ipseity of the person seeking asylum14 but also upon the ipseity of 
the person assuming the role of the immigration officer. For it reduces her to the mere executor 
of a “power without narrative” (Simon in Aas 2006, 150) whom, even in the case of giving 
refuge to the other, falls short of taking account of the other's singularity and whoness precisely 
because of the absence of listening and feeling with. In so doing, biometric identification ends up 
segregating between the person “acting” as an immigration officer and the person seeking 
asylum, while confining each  to the narrow and dichotomised roles of the giver of refuge (who 
is “able to act”) and the seeker of asylum (whose capacity to act has been reduced to the sole and 
silent status of receiving)15. This in turn takes solicitude and sympathy out of the encounter, 
leaving instead a sterile and simplistic, if not even patronising, sense of charity and benevolence. 
“In true sympathy,” Ricoeur (1992, 191) writes  
   
 the self, whose power of acting is at the start greater than that of its other, finds itself 
affected by all that the suffering other offers to it in return. For from the suffering 
other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn from the power of acting and 
existing but precisely from weakness itself. This is perhaps the supreme test of 
solicitude, when unequal power finds compensation in an authentic reciprocity in 
exchange, which, in the hour of agony, finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or 
the feeble embrace of clasped hands.  
 
 
Conclusion and further reflections16 
We began this paper by interrogating the ways in which biometrics is about identity and uniqueness 
in an attempt to uncover some of the bioethical stakes of biometric technology. This interrogation 
has led us straight into the quagmire of asking what identity is. Drawing upon the work of Cavarero, 
Schechtman, and Ricoeur, we explored some of the variations in the meaning of identity. Emphasis 
has been placed upon the distinction between the question “what?” and the question “who?” through 
                                                
14  I am intentionally using the phrase of “the person seeking asylum” instead of “asylum seeker” for the former 
denotes an 'action' whereas the latter is merely an identity ascription.  
 15    Jan Marta (1997, 206) also speaks of the notion of segregation when addressing some aspects of the  physician-
patient dynamics in relation to the issue of informed consent.  
16 Thanks to the anonymous reviewers and to Catherine Mills for pointing out some of the limitations of narrative 
ethics discussed in this concluding section.   
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which we examined the interplay between biometric technology and identity. Whilst, at first glance, 
biometrics may seem to be mainly concerned with the what aspect of identity, we argued that the 
who dimension is inevitably implicated as well, especially in the context of asylum. Given the 
importance of narrative to the question of who and to the notion of uniqueness, we proposed a 
narrative approach as a means of navigating through the distinctive bioethical implications of 
biometric technology. Our discussion, while admittedly being preliminary in both scope and nature, 
has revealed that, paradoxically, in its pursuit of capturing the singularity of the person, biometrics 
only ends up obstructing the exposure of singularity precisely because of its amputation of narrative 
from the sphere of identity. Thus, a pressing bioethical task would be to seek to preserve the 
narrative dimension of identity, which, in the words of Cavarero (2000, 34), constitutes the “house 
of uniqueness.”  
 
Of course, a narrative approach to the bioethics of biometrics is not without its limitations. For one 
thing, such an approach cannot take us as far as to fully understand the ways in which identity, 
security and asylum emerge as problem spaces in the first place, or how biometric technology is 
activated as a technique of governance and an apparatus of normalisation. Another limitation lies in 
the fact that power dynamics as well as institutional contexts are not always factored into the 
narrative perspective on identity and its securitisation. For instance, the relationship between the 
immigration officer and the asylum seeker is by no means a neutral one. It is, rather, imbued with a 
specific kind of power and framed within a specific institutional context, both of which have an 
undeniable and considerable bearing on the mode of address and on the interlocutory scene within 
which the story is recounted. Put simply, the inquisitorial tone and the probing frame by which the 
immigration officer asks the question “who are you?” already set the stage for and the limits of 
what can be recounted about oneself during the process of seeking asylum. In more general terms, 
many of these issues have been famously taken up by Foucault, especially in his consideration of 
the notion of truth-telling and the formation of the self. The Foucauldian governmentality and 
subject-formation thesis, in this sense, can help us understand the discursive constructions of 
identity and the ways in which biometric technology straddles the domain of power and knowledge. 
This approach, however, remains limited in scope as well, precisely because of its lack of 
engagement with the minutiae of personal experience and the narratable aspect of selfhood.  
 
The encounter of the narrativity thesis with the Foucauldian theory of subject-constitution is also 
what animates some of the discussions in Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself  (2005). Here 
Butler productively labours at the intersection between the different theories and philosophies of the 
self, providing another useful lens through which one can trace and juxtapose some of the above 
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limitations. Central to her argument is the idea that the very possibility of narrating oneself is 
dependent on social norms and circumscribed by the structure of address involving others. What 
fellows from this fundamental and irreducible dependency, according to Butler, is the impossibility 
of giving a full account of oneself and providing a definitive life-story insofar as  
 
the very terms by which we give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible 
to ourselves and to others, are not of our making. They are social in character, and 
they establish social norms, a domain of unfreedom and substitutability within which 
our “singular” stories are told (Butler 2005, 21), 
 
As such, stories do not become recognisable stories by simply being told. They have to go through 
the sieve of many social and linguistic conventions to be deemed worthy of recognition (see also 
Ricoeur’s (2005) thorough discussion in The Course of Recognition). Nor is the “I” in a full and 
exclusive possession of its own story. So in addition to the fact that “narrating, like saying, calls for 
an ear, a power to hear, a reception” (Ricoeur 2005, 251) as well as exposure and co-appearance 
(Cavarero 2000), narrating is also irredeemably at the mercy of norms. And whether the story 
moves us to tears or cripples us with laughter, norms remain indifferent for they are impersonal and 
do not coincide with the temporality of one’s life. “Discourse is not life; its time is not yours,” 
according to Foucault (in Butler 2005, 36). By subscribing to this Foucauldian stance, Butler 
introduces an important caveat that challenges Cavarero’s take on narrativity: to the extent that 
one’s account is reliant on norms which happen to exceed oneself, any attempt to give a coherent, 
authoritative and full-fledged story is bound to be interrupted by the time of the discourse, by that 
very language one deploys as a vehicle for giving an account of oneself. For Butler, this means that 
singularity itself is subject(ed) to being contested by the temporality of norms.  
 
While this is certainly a valid argument, one could, however, equally argue that the interruption 
brought about by language as well as the crisscrossing of the temporality of norms with the 
temporality of life only serve to reaffirm singularity, or more specifically, the plurality of 
singularity. For even if “I” has to substitute itself to norms in order to tell its story, the way it does 
so remains singular through and through. Each time is a different time and the way the story is told 
is a singular story in itself. Singularity does not evaporate with reiteration but only consolidates its 
unrepeatability and strengthens its resistance to being completely dissolved by/into norms. And 
whilst exposure is at once a singularising and collectivising experience (ibid., 34−35), this does not 
necessarily make singularity any less singular, but only yields a “singular plural” as Nancy (2000) 
puts it. So although norms permeate the very fibre of narrativity, submitting entirely to the 
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Foucauldian position would unduly disavow the nitty-gritty processes by which one uses and 
appropriates the norms, leading to the foregrounding of an abstract universal subject instead and 
mutely accepting the icy indifference of norms. I agree though with Butler’s view regarding the 
incomplete and non-definitive character of storytelling: “[t]he ‘I’ can tell neither the story of its own 
emergence nor the conditions of its own possibility” (Butler 2005, 37). Nor can it tell the story of its 
end, except in a speculative and fictitious manner. Completeness and definitiveness are but the 
necropolis of the story of the “I”. Yet such views do not necessarily subordinate Cavarero’s theory 
of storytelling to that of norms nor do they weaken its ethical purchase. Instead they solicit the 
helping hand of another ethics, one that can handle the necessary, but not-so-comfortable, 
intercourse between narrativity and norms. Before we say few words about this ethics, it is worth 
considering some of the consequences of Butler’s postulations with regard to our previous 
discussions on the issues of asylum, biometrics, and narrativity. 
 
In approaching these issues through the lens of Butler’s arguments, the initial question that 
immediately surges to the forefront is: to what extent can the story of the asylum seeker truly 
capture her whoness and fully reveal her singularity? Clearly, the notion of context can hardly be 
avoided here. Giving an account of oneself for the purpose of gaining the refugee status, and the 
protection it implies, “consists of speaking the lines that the institutional interpellation sets in place” 
(Frank 1997, 34). This entails the selection of facts, recollections and experiences that would 
qualify the story as a recognisable asylum story, and the use of a specific idiom that would allow 
the story to fulfil the manifold criteria required for obtaining asylum. Whether in terms of 
application forms or interviews (which often involve the presence of an interpreter complicating all 
the more the meditating structure, scene and mode of address), linguistic and institutional norms 
play a pivotal role. Depending on how they are used and in what circumstances, these norms can 
either enable or constrain storytelling, rendering the possibility of giving a coherent, consistent and 
reliable account a highly contingent enterprise. This is more so the case when the asylum applicant 
is summoned to undertake more than one interview or fill in more than one application form in 
order to establish the veracity and validity of her account. Added to that are the cases where the 
person, due to her history of torture and its debilitating effects on the first-person perspective, is 
unable to construct and articulate an integrated and meaningful life-story that can faithfully and 
accurately attest to that history and to her embodied ipseity in general: “[some] actual experiences 
may be too complex, too confusing, too provocative, too shameful, too private, or too common to 
convey without the help of a “made story” of some kind or other” (Greenspan 2003, 109). In such 
contexts, the made story will inevitably be subject to changes, revisions, variations and 
reinterpretations, despite any attempt to make it otherwise; i.e. to turn it into a full-fledged account 
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that is sealed with a permanent stamp of truth and accuracy. As Arthur Frank (in Brody 1997, 20) 
argues:  
 
The “same” story, retold on different occasions over a span of time, will be heard 
differently. The self actually engages in change and reformulation by retelling the 
“same” story. Thinking with stories thus demands that we attend carefully to how a story 
is used when it is told, how different meanings or shades of meaning are assigned to the 
story as a result.  
 
Or again: 
 
It’s well known that telling and retelling one’s past leads to changes, smoothings, 
enhancements, shifts away from the facts […] The implication is plain: the more you 
recall, retell, narrate yourself, the further you risk moving away from accurate self-
understanding, from the truth of your being (Strawson 2004, 447). 
 
Storytelling, in this sense, seems to unfold on a continuously shifting ground and occupy a peculiar 
and paradoxical space wherein the self is partially concealed (from itself and from others) at the 
very moment of its own revelation, and narrative is that which testifies to the inability of bearing 
witness to one’s own emergence and constitution rather than to the self-assured capacity to give a 
full account of oneself. It is as though hide-and-seek is the name of the game that permanently 
entertains the relationship between storytelling and the truth of one’s being. Pitched in this way, one 
may be tempted to promptly dismiss narrativity as a method of conveying whoness and housing 
singularity. For how can a thesis that is too changeable, fluid, precarious, paradoxical and context-
laden, possibly provide an anchoring point for the story of the self, let alone be used as a reliable 
means of thinking and doing ethics? However, to dismiss narrativity on these grounds would be too 
facile a conclusion. In fact, it seems to me that what is at issue here is not so much whoness and 
singularity per se, but the enduring epistemological and technical questions of truth and validity. 
The question is not whether storytelling is capable of revealing who one is, but whether this 
revelation is erupting out of the fountain of truth or emerging from the dungeons of fiction and 
confabulations. What if the story is not only a “made story” but also a “made-up story”? What if 
narrativity is but a futile act of sucking on the “honeycomb of memory”17 and risking the sting of 
the past without any promise or guarantee of finding a valid and working compass to guide one’s 
decisions (moral or otherwise)?  
                                                
17 I borrow this phrase from Walter Benjamin (1968) 
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By raising these questions, we are obviously coming full circle⎯a move that may well be perceived 
as a self-defeating detour, since it is in danger of reactivating the all-too-familiar epistemic doubt 
regarding the story and thereby leaving the room wide-open for biometrics to gain a firmer hold on 
the sphere of identity, to strengthen and capitalise on its truth claims to accuracy and validity. 
Nevertheless, admitting the limits of the narrativity thesis does not amount to a total defeat. It only 
emanates a sense of humbleness (unlike the haughtiness of the biometric paradigm) vis-à-vis the 
general ability of truthfully capturing and divulging whoness and singularity. It is indeed this 
humbleness (something that Butler herself affirms in her critique of narrativity) that opens up rather 
than forecloses the horizon of nonviolent ethics and preserves rather than destroys the creative 
dimensions of the different person perspectives. It is this humbleness that makes us aware of “the 
fragility of all human communication⎯its inevitable limits and uncertainty because of its reliance 
on forms (and, I suppose, beings) that are themselves inherently limited and uncertain” (Greenspan 
2003, 110). It is also this humbleness which reminds us that “[t]hinking with stories means that 
narrative ethics cannot offer people clear guidelines or principles for making decisions. Instead 
what is offered is permission to allow the story to lead in certain directions” (Frank in Brody 1997, 
20−21). To be fixated on truth and validity is to lose sight of this (ethical) opportunity. It is to 
obstruct the story’s lines of flight and to bring the movement of decision to a halt (hence the 
immobilising and limbo-like character of rigid asylum and immigration policies and technologies). 
It is not that truth is unimportant. But in the context of storytelling and narrative identity, truth and 
fiction are inextricably intertwined with no viable possibility of absolute disentanglement. Put 
simply, fiction is not necessarily devoid of truth nor is truth necessarily non-fictional. As Strawson 
(2004, 446) argues, “[w]hen Bernard Malamud claims that ‘all biography is ultimately fiction’, 
simply on the grounds that ‘there is no life that can be captured wholly, as it was’, there is no 
implication that it must also be ultimately untrue.”  
 
This sense of humbleness in narrativity does not only touch the question of truth, but extends to 
cover, in a related manner, the notions of definitiveness, completeness and fullness with regard to 
the life-story. As mentioned earlier, the possibility of giving a full, authoritative and definitive 
account of oneself is continuously interrupted by the temporality of norms. Death is the only 
plenitude, the real terminus of every life-story. Because “I” is in time, it is never on time. “I” is 
always missing an appointment by either being too late for the rendez-vous with its origin, or too 
early for the rendez-vous with its end. Its account is an amputated account made out of prosthetic 
and phantom narratives. Paradoxically, it is precisely this temporal belatedness or prematurity that 
injects the “I” with the possibility of creating itself anew and devising its own stories. Were it not 
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for this décalage, “I” would be capable of neither formation nor narration. In a way, then, before “I” 
can stand up with pride and say: “I know”, it has to admit to itself that it does not know. Before “I” 
can stand up with poise and declare: “I can”, it has to come to terms with the fact that it cannot. 
Before “I” can stand up at all, it has to tremble, lose balance and fall. The capacity of the “I” is, 
therefore, continuously haunted by its own incapacity. Its potency is constantly threatened by the 
shadow of its own impotency. Its transparency is often eclipsed by its own opacity. This translates, 
as we have seen so far and through Butler’s critique, into a partial obscurity and a lack of 
completeness and definitiveness vis-à-vis the life-story, elements that beg for humbleness and 
fragility (rather than sovereignty and power) as ways of accounting and relating. From here 
transpire at least two conclusions, one of which has to do with the other ethics, while the second has 
a direct and practical bearing on the everyday life of the person seeking asylum. 
 
As regards the latter, it concerns the ways in which the non-definitiveness of the story, while 
representing an intrinsic limitation within the narrativity thesis, may also represent an opportunity. 
This opportunity is nothing other than the opportunity of saving the story from becoming a snare. 
Were it not for this non-definitive character, the sealing and authoritative prospect of the “once and 
for all” of the story might turn narrative itself into a straightjacket restricting the ebbs and flows of 
what remains of one’s lived life outside of and otherwise than that particular story. In the context of 
asylum, this becomes a crucial point, especially once the refugee status has been granted. Dwelling, 
in a definitive way, on the asylum/refugee story runs the risk of totalising identity and fossilising 
the person into the mode of being a refugee. This in turn can have many negative implications, not 
least in terms of hindering the process of genuine (rather than merely functional) inclusion and 
belonging into the host community, unwittingly encouraging a sense of a disabling and extended 
over-reliance on the story and on what comes out of it as a bundle of charitable, and in many ways 
superficial, benefits (for example, asylum vouchers, which unconstructively strengthen the “poor 
me” sentiment), and impeding the person’s potential and attempt to reconstruct her life beyond the 
asylum story and without having to carry indefinitely her refugee status as a badge of identification. 
There is certainly more to the “refugee” than her refugee story despite the fact that her singular 
refugee story is an integral part of who and what she is. That is not to say, however, that the story 
must be washed away with the detergent of forgetting. Forgetting, “that thief of time” as Ricoeur 
(2005, 118) refers to it, would be, in this case, akin to committing an act of blasphemy and betrayal 
towards the pain of the story. What is needed instead is an ethico-political approach, which extends 
beyond the mere provision of a safe haven to enable the person to develop and explore different 
ways of relating to and remembering the story so as to successfully integrate its pain into the fabric 
of her being instead of permanently identifying with it.  
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Undoubtedly, one might wonder, at this stage, if the narrative approach (with its qualities, 
challenges, and visions) towards asylum policy can be amenable to practical application. In a 
neoliberal culture that is predominantly concerned with security rather than solicitude, with control 
rather than trust, with power rather than equality, with self-interest rather than care for the other, 
such an approach may come across as being too theoretical, if not even too unrealistic to be precise. 
How could narrative ethics possibly pierce through the thick bubble of asylum policy, a policy that 
seems to be increasingly functioning under the spell of biometric solutions? How could its 
humbleness, fragility, and uncertainty possibly compete with the luring hi-tech veneer of biometrics 
and its haughty claims to accuracy, truth and objectivity? In their very specificity, these questions 
are also able to invoke something of a more general dimension, something to do with the hiatus 
between ethics and (technocratic) politics, which for so long has been the source of many aporias, 
conflicts and contradictions. While I do not have exact answers to such questions, I do feel however 
that, if it is to be feasible at all, narrative ethics has to be preceded by, and contribute to, a radical 
transformation at the level of the mental schema which currently governs the landscape of politics 
and its exclusionist policies of border management, asylum and immigration. Without the necessary 
shift from the death-producing politics of control (I am referring here to “the fact of exposing 
someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, 
expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault 2003 [1976], 256), examples of which can be found in 
the tragic deaths that are still taking place in the Strait of Gibraltar and the US-Mexican border) to a 
responsible and accountable politics, the narrative approach itself might do more harm than good to 
the person seeking asylum. For it might risk turning into a confessionary apparatus instead of 
providing a space for solicitude and sympathy. Without this shift in the political imaginary, asking 
the policy-maker to give up biometric control in favour of narrative ethics would be like asking a 
vampire to give away her fangs to the dentist. Nevertheless, instead of resorting to cynicism, one 
can, as a starting point, intervene by demonstrating how such policies do not only fail but also 
worsen the situations they seek to remedy. It is a matter of heightening policy-makers’ awareness 
that fighting against unwanted immigration and asylum with technology or otherwise only ends up 
producing an even more unmanageable chain of problems, such as people trafficking, death at the 
border, and exploitation. And this is perhaps the tragedy of contemporary forms of governance: the 
more problems they try to solve, the more problems they create. After all: 
 
Migrants and those who facilitate their migration resort to staggering feats of ingenuity, 
courage and endurance to assert their right to move and to flee […] The question is how 
much suffering will be imposed on innocent people, and how much racism will be 
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stoked up […] before governments finally abandon the effort (Hayter 2000, 152).  
  
From the concatenation of the above reflections, it is clear that, if taken as a standalone approach, 
narrative bioethics would not always be able to singlehandedly tackle the manifold challenges 
pertaining to the field of asylum and biometric identification. This limitation is, in fact, what calls 
for a well-rounded “coalitionist ethics” whose approach must be based on the cross-pollination and 
cross-fertilisation of different, albeit contradictory, theoretical and empirical perspectives and an 
appreciation of the distinct qualities of each. Butler’s work on “responsibility”, Derrida’s take on 
the notions of “hospitality” and “cosmopolitanism”, and Ricoeur’s trinity of “self-esteem”, “justice” 
and “care for the other”, are but some of the examples that signpost many promising and 
interesting⎯though not always converging⎯pathways for addressing what is ethically at stake in 
the current policies of asylum and immigration. But despite all its limitations, narrative will still 
remain “an indispensable and ubiquitous feature of the moral landscape” (Arras 1997, 68). So, for 
the time being, and in the context of this paper, let us be content with the conclusion that, the moral 
of the story is perhaps nothing other than listening to and feeling the story itself. 
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